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KATALIN GOMBOS 
From traditional fundamental rights to 
the modern concept of civil liberties 
"...the rights of all people 
at all time all situations..."* 
The civil liberties — in a by now general opinion — constitute a group of 
civil rights guaranteeing the citizens' freedom of action, conduct or condition in 
certain respects, owing to the fact that the State's attitude to the civil liberties is 
expressed mainly by the permission of their free exercise, setting of the limits 
within which they are to be realized, prohibition or limitation to a considerable 
extent of State intervention, protection by legal means of their exercise, guaranty 
of reparation and imposition of sanctions for their violation. The tendency of 
this group of rights is negative, insofar as their realization gives rise to 
multilateral legal relationships (with the State as principal obligor), where the 
essential demand the other parties have upon the State is that it should refrain 
from interfering with their rights. 
The concept of civil liberties, however, has undergone several 
modifications in the course of its history; the meaning of liberty having been 
different in the 18th and 19th centuries from what it has been in the 20th 
century. In the period of its emergence, the notion of civil liberty was 
interpreted broadly by the theoretical systems. This broad definition was based 
on natural law and its conception of freedom, which covered the entire group 
of property and personal rights in the present-day sense of these terms. Life, 
liberty, a sound, unimpaired physical condition, the personal possessions in the 
strict sense of the term all fell within the category of bona civitas.2 The concepts 
of property and liberty were known to seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
thinkers in a way proper to the age, as overlapping categories. The scope of the 
concept of property was much wider than mere possessions in the legal sense of 
the word. The concept included not only material possessions, but also all of 
the assets belonging to a person, thus his life and rights were also called his 
1 Cranston, M.: Human rights and supposed. D. Raphael (ed.) Political Theory and the 
Rights of Man. London, 1967. 49- p. 
2 See also Locke, John: Levél a vallási türelemről. Budapest, 1973. 49. p. 
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property. And at this juncture the concept of property and liberty were 
inseparably intertwined. The concept of liberty included the group of rights 
presently called the freedom of the individual and, besides, the right to use 
freely one's personal gifts and faculties as well as the right to venture upon 
money-making (mainly industrial or commercial) enterprisses. ^The scope of 
the concept of freedom was so widely extended as to include all the rights 
human beings were entitled to, which allowed the rights to seem liberties by 
nature. 
If we want to find the orginis of civil liberties in history, we must trace 
them back to the rise of the bourgeoisie. Though we may come across the 
notion of freedom in previous ages, as well, the bourgeoisie was the first class — 
a fact already discovered by the young Marx — to make conscious efforts to 
disguise its own class interests as universal human interests and was thereby the 
first to formulate in generalized form, i.e. with a claim to univerality on an 
all-societal plane, the need for safeguards as the due of the individual. 4 
It is this universal need, this idea of a sphere of freedom offering 
protection against interference from the outer world or external impact, that 
was absent from previous ages. Though there may have been rights and 
privileges earlier, granted to smaller social groups, these were, however, of a 
particular nature. The idea of rights as the due of mankind owing to its humanity 
could not have been proposed in any other context than where man — at least 
in theory — became free, i.e. freed from the legal status of the slave, who was 
denied an independent personality, or later from that of the serf, considered as 
belonging to the land, he could, in theory, become freely the subject of rights 
and obligations. This need, however, could not be formulated within the system 
of feudalism in other terms than as an ideological demand, expressing the need 
for progress. It was the ascending bourgeoisie that was committed to the 
implementation of the idea, while the role of supporting pillar was taken by the 
systems of natural law. 
When the term natural law is used, it tends to call the school of natural 
law to our mind, with Grotius, Wolff, Thomasius and Pufendorf as its most 
eminent exponents. Yet the group of ideas forming the subject of natural law, 
which played such an important part in the development of the political law of 
Western Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, cannot be 
restricted to the conceptions of the above legal philosophers. Philosophers, 
politicians, jurists and praticing lawyers have all had a part in making the world 
aware of the changes that had taken place in man's condition and place in the 
Universe and in shaping the legal and political forms and institutions 
corresponding to this new siutaion. Thus Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or, from the 
3 See particularly Kovács István - Szabó Imre: Az emberi jogok dokumentumokban. 
Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, 1980.47. p. 
4 This problem is expressed in the young Marx's theory. See particularly Letter of Marx 
to Bolte (25. nov. 1871.) 
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opposite side, Bodin, Hermes or Achenwall all had a prominent share in laying 
the foundations of the actual legal theory and the positive system of institions. 
Natural law, as a particular legal outlook, gave expression to the basic 
principles of the ideology, political, religious and moral views of the ascending 
borugeoisie. The incentive behind natural law was polemical for more than one 
reason: it had to fight against the increasingly irrational feudal political and 
ideological system (by then a hindrance to free activity), the petrified 
institutions and their legal justification, the theological constructions 
intertwined with and sanctioning secular power; and it had to express, as a 
matter of principle, and an appeal to equity and fairness, the bourgois' claim to 
freedom and eqauality. Equally, the critical function was combined with 
constructive-constitutive aspirations; where custom allowed it, natural law gave 
expression to civil interests by outlining positive legal institutions, and providing 
theoretical grounding for practical legislation. 
When natural law had demolished the theoretical scaffolding supporting 
the 'old order', it found itself facing a totally new problem. It had to cope with 
the problem of individual activity aimed at the reconstitu tion of society by 
persons individualized in their possessions, nature, mentality, with the problems 
of the individual and citizen's claim to human political rights, and with the 
problems of the moral and academic justification of these asprations. It had to 
circumscribe the personal liberty of the citizens, and to mark off the citizens' 
private sphere of freedom from that of State authority, it had to state its views as 
to which agencies and means of publicity the citizen wishing to give voice to his 
own views besides and even in opposition to other people's opinions, could 
have recourse to, it had to lay down and fix the rights the subject of economic 
life was entitled to, in the interest of the enrichment of the individual, as well as 
in the parallel interest of the prosperity of the community, and, last but not least 
it had to appeal to security provided by the law, the realization of lawful 
asprations, and the guarantees of their assertion in order that the interests 
which had taken the form of laws should actually and permanently be present in 
the life of society. 
In the constructions of seventeenth and eighteenth century political law 
in Western Europe high priority was given to civil liberty. Though the legal 
concept of freedom was derived, in the last analysis, from positive legal 
opportunities and legal institutions, the meaning of liberties, formulated within 
the domain of natural law and often verified by speculation, in their turn, also 
became a starting point for legislation and jurisprudence. 
Each system of natural law made use of the triple notion of natural state 
— contract — social status, and correlated a particular state of human liberty to 
each of the three components. The freedom of the natural stat (status naturalis) 
was the natural liberty (libertas naturalis), the freedom of the social or civil 
status (status civilis) was the civil liberty enriched with moral undertones. The 
latter was conveyed by the freedom of human being?, based on man's sociability 
and tendency to gregariousness, to conclude contracts. The political thrust of 
the libertas naturalis (some elements of which had already been present in the 
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early documents of constitutional law, criticizing the society of Estates and 
Orders, the privileges of the feudal aristocracy and the violations and flouting of 
the law) was directed against the status quo of power, and against the state of 
institutionalized lack of freedom. This 'freedom' had no definite legal content, 
and, at first, the real object of protest was not specified, either. Thus we are led 
to the conclusion that the status naturalis and its libertas had an essentially 
methodological function within the sphere of natural law, it was a kind of 
'prototype', a ground for reference to the notion of civil liberty to be created 
sometime in the future. At first the 'iura connati', listed in the catalogs as a legal 
projection of liberty, lacked a political and legal content, they did no more than 
to describe the civil law relating to the citizens and the moral obligations of 
princes. The exponents of natural law identified the libertas natura lis most of 
the time with man's freedom of action and, less frequently, with the freedom of 
will, and sometimes by deriving it from libertinism and defining it as 
'independence' from the will of other's, an unrestrained desire that every 
people may do as they please'.5 
This confusum chaos (Thomasius), this bellum omnium contra omnes 
(Hobbes), or rather the advisability to suppress it was the basis of the contract 
between individuals. It was the conclusion of the social contract, i.e. a voluntary 
agreement between human beings that gave rise to the social status, with its 
concomitant libertas civilis, the freedom of the citizens, which in the thought of 
most of the exponents of natural law was an institutional framework for the 
putting forth of individual capacities and talents and for the realization of 
human and civil liberties. Of course, it does not follow automatically from the 
idea of contract in itself that emancipation is open to all. Entering into the social 
status might also mean the acceptance of the absolute power of the State, and it 
might imply the total transfer of sovereignty as well as the keeping up of 
sovreignty, which is not affected by the conclusion of the social contract. It may 
suffice here to refer to the differences between the natural law as conceived by 
Hobbes and by Rousseau. 
The radical turning-point in the history of civil liberties was the victory 
of the bourgeois revolutions (and the most important among these, as to its 
impact, was the French Revolution of 1789). These revolutions not only gave 
expression to the citizens' longing for freedin (protesting against the state of 
non-freedom), but also, by having done away with the feudal legal system, 
created a legal formation of a new type, and drawn up a catalogue appealing to 
the rights of man. In this new system, the main stress was on the civil liberties. 
For the 'liberties' no longer appeared in this connection as a mere, theoretically 
formulated demand, but were transformed into the aspiration and legal 
requirement of the victorious class to give the demands serving for the 
ideological basis upon which the power of the bourgeoisie was to be built the 
5 Wolff, Christian: Grundsätze des Natur - und Völkerrechts Halle, 1754. 77. §. See also 
Klippel, D.: Politische Freiheit und Freiheitsrechte im deutschen Naturrecht des 18. Jahrhunderts. 
Padernborn, 1976. 33-, 35. p. 
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form of law, binding upon society as a whole. It was there, in the liberty of the 
achieved civil status, the liberatas civilis, that the content elements expressing 
the already full-fledged interests of the ascending bourgeoisie made their 
appearance. An important part was played in the crystallization of the new idea 
of liberty by such theoretical and legal aspirations as the naming of the potential 
opponents of liberty, the drawing up of the catalogue of human rights, and the 
frequent discussions about the abuse of power. 
The natural law of the Englightenment combined with the notion of civil 
liberty had reached the stage where it became political opposition to the 
existing feudal establishment. On a purely theoretical plane, the change was 
indicated by the fact that new meanings were attached to such terms as 'natural 
state', 'man' and 'liberty'. Human rights, which had also been political rights 
from then on, were derived from man's essence, personality, i.e. his make-up as 
a social being, and actual social conditions. On the one hand, a distinction was 
made between the notions of State and society, on the other hand, a powerful 
liberal opposition was shown when the demands for liberty were formulated so 
as to be directed against the State. (P.J.A. Feuerbach, K.H. Gross, S.S. Witte.) The 
demands that had surfaced here were those of the typical liberal political 
theories, such as personal freedom, safeguards for the immunity of the private 
sphere against State inferference, guarantees for the access to publicity 
(especially through the freedom of the press), the removal of the economy from 
the sphere of State activity (through demanding the freedom of property and the 
freedom of industry and commerce, in particular), security based on law and 
order (through binding the prince by means of positive law). 
A great importance was attached to these characteristically liberal 
demands in the contemporary documents. The French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen — the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen 
— is often called the catalogue of classic fundamental rights. High priority is 
given there to liberty, and a definition can also be found there, as follows: 
-'Liberty means that we can do anything which is not harmful to the interest of 
others. Therefore the exercise of natural rights has no other limit than the 
imperative to ensure for the other members of society the exercise of the same 
rights...'6 Besides giving a clear-cut definition of liberty, the Declaration also 
lists the civil liberties. On the evidence of what were considered fundamental 
rights, the trinity of liberty-property-safety pivoted in fact on a single right: in 
the bourgeois society the real need was felt for the right to own private 
property, to possess it freely, with free disposition over it, to safeguard and 
protect it. Therefore the freedom to own property was one of the most 
important of the classic fundamental rights. The natural law laid down the rights 
the subject of the economic life was entitled to, in order that the growing rich of 
the individual might run parallel with the increasing prosperity of the 
community; that is why it stressed that the right to own property, to practice 
industry or commerce were man's inherent natural inalienable rights. Carrying it 
6 Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. 1789. 4. §. 
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even a step further, when presenting the right to own property (illusorily) as a 
universal human right, a category of emancipation, and when expressing it as a 
demand by 'civil society' to free itself from the authority of the 'political State'. 
To consider the right to own property as a human right is, of course, an 
illusion. It was Marx who pointed to the fact, in a biting tone, in his work, 'To 
the Jewish question' that the only right that could be built upon private property 
was the 'right to selfishness', and that the loud claims to equality by the political 
sphere were only a disguise for the prosaic inequality of 'bourgeois society', For 
the exponents of natural law of the Enlightement it was an ever-present illusion 
that the rights derived from the abstract idealized notions of 'man' and 'liberty' 
could actually emancipate society and, in the last analysis, the entire human 
race. Yet the above liberties, even if they had been universally extended and 
guaranteed to every member of the society, could not have called into being the 
realm of liberty and equality only in the dreams of the exponents of natural law, 
because these conceptions worked on the supposition that proved to be a 
fiction in disguiese, that everyone having a civil status could also gain the status 
of proprietor and, through this, the human status. When the French declared in 
the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen the citizens' right to 
own property as a universal human right, they used a legal-ideological fiction, 
viz. that in the bourgeois society, at the level of the realization of basic activities, 
every man might own and, indeed owned property, i.e. disposed over the means 
allowing him to develop freely his abilities. It was only in these terms that the 
Declaration could present the citizens' right as a universal human right. Yet the 
society of proprietors and industrialists, with its laissez faire economy and 
competition, tended to become the realm of non-freedom for those not owning 
property. The only society where the citizens' right can be considered as 
universal human right with any claim to reality is, where from the grassroots 
level of the political sphere upwards, on the level of basic activities each and all 
have the opportunity to realize their human potential and build free, organic 
commun!tites. In any other case, the freedom of the citizen is just an abstraction 
devoid of sense, having a single function: to disguise the lack of freedom of the 
actual man. 
If the scope of civil liberties were to be restricted to those classic 
fundamental rights declared by the victorious bourgeois revolutions, we should 
have to content ourselves with a rather meagre catalogue of rights. Just as it 
would be wrong, from a historical point of view, to draw the boundary line 
between the victory of bourgeois revolutions and the bourgeois development in 
their wake too firmly; the separation of the early phase of liberties from their 
later growth is also inadmissible. The catalogue of liberties began to be 
extended as soon as the first constitutions following the victory of bourgeois 
revotions were issued (e.g. the 1791 or 1793 constitution of France), and the 
later development of the law, taking place, by then, under the conditions of a 
bourgois society, completed the system of fundamental liberties with a variety of 
laws. The freedom of association was declared as well as the right to organize 
unions, and the freedom of science and education was also proclaimed. Almost 
112 
every State regulated the problems of citizenship, as a preliminary to civil 
liberties, on a constitutional plane. After the turn of the century in particular, as 
a result of the demands made by the growing labour movement, the declaration 
of the right to organize trade unions was becoming more and more common. 
We could continue the list with the different variations, and forms of the 
institutionalized liberties. Still — as pointed to by Lajos Szamel — 'there is no 
doubt that the catalogue of liberties was substantially extended in the period 
ranging from the 1789 French declaration to the Constitutions issued following 
World War II, and in accordance with this the international standard for the 
evaluation of the constitutions of individual States with regard to whether they 
conform to the requirements of constitutionality, with special reference to civil 
liberties, was also rising higher and higher, yet, we can also state that in the 
course of two centuries no further group came to be added to the original three 
groups of fundamental civil liberties. These were: freedom of the individual, the 
freedom of expressing one's opinions and beliefs, and the freedom of political 
action.'7 As Lajos Szamel observed, the catalogue of civil liberties had been 
constantly extended, widened, but the seminal period, from the point of view of 
the basic system, was the era of the bourgeois revolutions and the following 
bourgeois development. The three classic groups of civil liberties were 
institutionalized in the constitutions of individual States under the form of 
newer and newer liberties, while the system as a whole remained unchanged. 
If constitutionalism is basically prevaliling in a State, the proclaiming of 
liberties included in the above three groups of liberties — though different 
variations may occoiur from country — serves as a guideline in setting the limits 
of constitutional liberty. For the liberties cannot be absolutely unlimited, 
because every form of regulation (including the constitution and the various 
laws) have a bearing on how rights are to be exercised, and, of necessity, 
conditions are limits, as well. It is of vital importance, however, where the limits 
of the legal regulation of freedom are drawn. The broadest interpretation of this 
legal framework can be found in the 1949 Constitution of the GFR or in the 
latest European constitutions (Greece 1975, Portugal 1976, Spain 1978). Taking 
the above constitutions into consideration, we can draw up the most extensive 
catalogue of liberties to date. 
These liberties are: right to life, to the enjoyment of physical and mental 
health, to personal liberty, right to moral integrity, freedom of belief, 
conscience, religious and ideological convictions, freedom of expressing 
opinions, of speech and writing, picture and diagram, freedom of news 
communication, mass communication and information; artistic freedom -
including the freedom of liberary creation mentioned separately, the right to 
cultural improvement, academic freedom: the freedom of science, research and 
education; freedom of assembly and meeting, freedom of association, including 
the right to found unions and societies and to form coalition, or the right to 
found associations for assuring and developing the working and economic 
7 Szamel Lajos: Az állampolgári szabadságjogok. Budapest. 1987. 23. p. 
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conditions, the right to organize in trade unions, the freedom of choosing one's 
job and place of work, of choosing one's ca reer through the free choice 
between educational opportunities: educational or training institutions; 
freedom of movement, including besides the right to change one's residence 
and free movement within the State the right to leave the State, as well; the right 
of petition and communication (so-called right of petition), moreover the right 
to immunity from interference with one's privacy, home and correspondence, 
and other communications through the postal and telecommunication services. 
The considerable extension of the catalogue of rights as compared to 
the classic fundamental rights is quite obvious even from this list. The range of 
the civil liberties, however, is far from being complete, we must reckon with its 
progressive extension, in reaction to the challenges of modern experience. 
Besides the gradual widening of its scope, its development in another direction 
is also worthy of notice. The so-called classic fundamental rights are 
outstanding components of the development of society and, within this, of 
formal, institutionalized law, the lasting values of universal human culture, 
requiring for that very reason to be reinterpreted by each period of history and 
to be adapted by them to their peculiar conditions. To cite a single example: it is 
evident that our interpretation of the freedom of the press differs widely from 
the interpretation given to the same notion in the sventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The maning of the classic and the modern freedom of the press differs 
considerably, notwithstanding the feet that it continues to be the same 
proclaimed right. The freedom of the press in the modem sense of the word has 
to be defined broadly. By now, the word press means not only printed matter, 
but also a wide range of mass communication media, the so-called electronic 
media, which are also subject to regulation. On the other hand, the meaning of 
this particular right also underwent a change, for the classic meaning (the 
prohibition of preliminary censorship and the criminal responsibility for the 
output of the press) was extended to include access to information (i.e. the 
freedom to obtain information). 
Under the impact of the civilisation-oriented development in our 
century social conditions and circumstances have surfaced carrying new 
interpretations of freedom, and to proclaim these as liberties will be the task of 
the immediate future. The constitutional development of States in modern times 
demonstrates that the 'universalization' of rights gave rise to a radical change in 
the development of the civil liberties, as well. Beginning with the early 1980s the 
view that a qualitative change took place in the advance of human rights, has 
become more and more common. In this view, it is not only a simple extension 
of the catalogue of rights that is involved, but also the feet that the change in 
degree becomes the starting point of a new interpretation os these rights. Karol 
Vassk in his papeff on the development of human rights as an institution put 
forth the hypothesis that there were three stages of legal development By 
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making use of the slogans of the great French revolution,8 the three stages could 
be labelled as Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité. The firstgeneration of rights, that 
of Liberté contained the 'negative', individualistic liberties. The characteristic 
features of the second generation, that of Égalité, are the economic, social and 
cultural rights. In the third generation, that of Fraternité, previoiously unknown 
concepts were added to the problem complex of human rights.9 
Seen from a historical aspect, it has been the third generation that 
reacted to the processes of modern experience, and wished to put the existing 
demands into a legal form. In this systematic treatment of rights, under the 
heading of the so-called solidarity rights, a new generation of rights, the course 
of 20th-century development can also be found. 
Of the rights falling within the scope of the third generation, most of the 
authors mention by name the following: the right to improvement and progress, 
to peace, a pollution-free environment, access to and the free flow of 
information and to a share in the common heritage of mankind. Of these rights, 
the right to peace and access to information fall certainly within the scope of 
our subject, in connection with the notion of liberties tailored to the needs of 
the 20th century. 
The problems of the right to peace occur mainly in international law, 
just as the most important task of the UNO is to preserve peace and security. 
The importance of the right to peace is — to use an analogy from national law — 
similar to the relations between the equal rights of citizens and their other 
rights. Thus the right to peace can be considered rather as the supreme freedom 
which is the precondition of the realization and guaranteeing of all the other 
human rights. The 1984 and 1985 Resolutions of the UNO General Assembly 
proclaimed the right to peace; while not making clear how to solve the problems 
which might arise from the contents of the new right. It is principally on the 
international plane that efforts to outline the nature of the new rights, including 
the right to peace, have been made, to date. However, there are such among the 
third generation of rights, which are already beginning to make their presence 
felt in national legislation, as well. (E.g. free access to information.) 
The proclamation of free access to information in the constitution — 
which had been the peculiarity of only a few States, as yet — made plain a social 
need which was typical of the 20th century. The 20th century, with its 
accelerated progress, made man a real 'social being', a 'citoyen'. (It will suffice 
to mention the extension of the vote to all adult citizens, male as well as female. 
Or we may cite the 'fashionable' pressentday agency, the direct democratic 
forum — e.g. plebiscites —, the right of complaint and of petition, to which 
references are made more and more frequently, etc.) If the citizens want to 
make their rights, following from their status, effective, they will have an im 
8 See, e.g., Marks, S.P.: Emerging human rights: a new generation for the 1980-s? 
Rutgers Law Review 1981. No. 2. 441. p. 
9 Vasak, Karel: A 30-year struggle the sustained effort to give force of law to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. — The UNESCO Courier 1977. Nov. 
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perative need for a certain amount of information. For, without having access to 
information, the rights ensuring the freedom of political action cannot be 
exercised by now. We can indeed extend the problem from people's everyday, 
private sphere to include even science. To put it differently, by now, having 
access to information is indispensable, even for life as an individual. 
In this connection, information denotes the kind of particular 
knowledge (which is not taken here in its abstract, epistemological sense of a 
piece of universal knowledge) which has a special usefulness in the contacts 
between people. This useful knowledge is, in the last analysis, the cognitive 
prerequisite of the realization of the peculiar human quality, of the functions 
deriving from this quality, and the existential potential of the individual, of 
groups of individuals or, more broadly speaking, of the entire society, of their 
being or becoming what they really are or should be. 
Approaching the problem from a negative angle, the lack of information, 
the information gap makes impossible to realize this very peculiarity of our 
humanity. Thus, without gaining access to information, the availability of a wide 
variety of other rights is inconceivable. Consequently, a high priority should be 
given to the need for access to information, and the requirement should be laid 
down in the constitution as a fundamental civil liberty. 
As to the substance of the right to information and having access to 
information, there is still a lot of vagueness about it. Of the international 
documents the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, though not 
referring to this right by name, includes in its prescriptions for the freedom of 
expression some provisions to s the effect that the States are prohibited from 
pusuing activities hindering the access to or dissemination of information. In the 
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed in 
Helsinki in 1975 there are some international safeguards of the freedom of the 
press in the broad sense of the expression, but this document does not regulate 
content problems, either. 
In the specialist literature on the subject, the rights of the access to 
information type are discussed in several variations and under several forms. 
Nevertheless, this seemingly terminological variety disguises differences in the 
content of the right, and this have given rise to much discussion about the 
matter. Has it no more to it than that the right to information can be replaced by 
a great number of synonyms? It is easy to see that the terms often differ in 
meaning, though sometimes only in shades of meaning. The right to information 
has a manifold meaning, including besides access to information the obligation 
that, in support of the realization of this right, the State organs are obliged to 
provide access to citizens and vaious communities of citizens to information 
(official secrets alone are exceptions to this rule), the freedom to disseminate 
information and the right to self-determination in information can also be 
grouped under this term. 
As the right itself has been made up of a number of individual 
components, points of connection with rights of a similar nature may 
automatically be found. Such a point of connection may exist between the rights 
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to communication,10 mentioned by name mainly by English authors, and the 
rights to information. The rights to communication offer a broad framework, 
within which the free choice between pieces of information, the free 
dissemination of information are also enclosed, together with other partial 
entitlements (such as certain participation rights and access to culture). Another 
point of connection can be found with the freedom of the press, in the modern 
sense of the term. As information is conveyed to the recipients mainly through 
the modern mass communication media (which may be the most extensive 
individual outlet for the realization of the right), the right to dissemination of 
and access to information is by all means worthy of mention. The right to 
gaining and providing information is the point, where the right to information 
and the freedom of the press are connected. Taking the Hungarian model of 
regulation as a starting point, it is easy to understand that the modern freedom 
of information is also made up of several components. To begin with, one is 
entitled to access to information, which is synonymous with the freedom to 
obtain information. Another aspect of this entitlement is that the press hat tasks 
deriving from the obligation to provide information or otherwise connected 
with the access to information. These tasks mean for the press that they are 
obliged to provide, in the first place, authentic, prompt and precise information. 
In order that the press may fully meet this engagement, the press itself has to 
have proper access to the information that it is supposed to convey to the 
public. And here we are coming accross the third component of the right to 
information, whereby the organs listed in the text of the law are obliged to 
provide information for the press, i.e. the press is also entitled to have access to 
information. 
The right to have access and disseminate information is an important • 
precondition of the exercise of other fundamental rights and liberties. The 
quality and standard of the system of information is determined by the stage of, 
development of the society concerned. The mass media are certainly the most 
important area of the system of mass communication. In the 20th century the 
mass media can become the possible means of manipulation. For the very 
reason that mass media may make communication impossible (because the 
audience has no means to react at once), the relation between them is 
completely unilateral. This amounts to their being capable of stopping the 
'dialogue', the form of communication that makes criticism possible at all. 
Manipulation by the mass media is made possible, in the first place, not by the 
fact that only one person or very few people can address an audience of several 
millions over a wide range of time and space, exerting a lasting influence on 
their consciousness thereby, but by the inability of the millions to reply.11 
Thus, while the realtionship with the mass media is seemingly the most 
civilised of interactions, the abuse of mass media may lead to its becoming the 
1 0 See, generally about this question the right to communicate: a new human right. 
Dublin 1983. 
1 1 See Marcuse, Herbert: One-dimensional Man. Boston, 1968. 
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most harmful" and anti-human of relationships. This demonstrates that 
interference with human liberties is not necessarily brutal (e.g. the policy of 
apartheid), it may also be seemingly civilised. This is the reason why mass media 
and the legal regulation affecting them should be given high social and political 
priority. 
The considerable technological progress of our age provided mankind 
with a rich assortment of mass media (telephone, radio, television, electronic 
computation, the audio-visual recording of information, telecommunication 
satellites etc.) The advances in technology, however, proved to be a mixed 
blessing, brining in their train several problems, in addition to new 
opportunities of realizing civil liberties. This holds particularly true of the 
safeguards of personal liberties. More than one author furmulates his 
reservations about the latest 'wonders' of technology and the need for legal 
protection against them. They would like to protect the citizens' privacy against 
telephone-tapping systems and other kinds of secret monitoring, by cameras 
etc.12 Others want to set and define clearly the limits of the use of psychological 
tests offensive to personality, and of the employment of such methods of 
investigation in criminal proceedings and civil lawsuits. Another requirement 
formulated by them is that for the errors committed by computer-based data 
processing compensation should be paid, and that the ethical and legal 
problems posed by the latest methods of medical science, such as artificial 
insemination, organ transplants and proceedings allowing of 
psycho-pharmacological manipulation and genetic engineering should be laid 
down in statutory regulation with the utmost clarity and unambiguity.13 
Presentday legal thought has already been penetrated by these ideas, but the 
statutory regulation of these requirements, fixing the limits of action, still 
remains to be done. 
As demonstrated by the above reflections, the twentieth-century trend 
of civil liberties requires an approach which is totally different from that of the 
past. In our increasingly complex world, recently institutionalized new liberties 
are becoming the parts of common legal knowledge. These liberties of the new 
type cannot be approached through the traditional perspective, for the most 
important characteristic of these rights is their universality, exceeding the limits 
of the traditional civil condition. A better uderstanding of the increasingly 
complex character of the 'media', through which this right is to be realized, has 
led to the formulation of a new theory and the emergence of the up-todate 
forms of human rights, tailored to the needs of the twentieth century. 
1 2 See, e.g., Miller, A.R.: Der Einbruch in die privatsphäre Neuwied, 1973-
1 3 See, e.g., Wolstenbome, G.: Man and his future. London, 1983-
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